The FATA Peace Agreements and Roles of the TTP and the Pakistani Army (Part one)

Chronology of Peace Agreements

The Pakistani military involvement in FATA began in 2004, after Musharraf reluctantly deployed the Pakistani army in FATA  on the United States’ constant demands. However, the FATA wars are dotted with periods of war that are only stopped by stages of mysterious peace deals that only seem to offer relief and breathing-space to the TTP. The following is a list of all the peace deals that the Pakistanis have struck with non-state terrorist actors in FATA:


• Shakai Agreement with Nek Mohammad in April, 2004.

• Sararogha Agreement with Baitullah Mehsud in February, 2005.

• The Waziristan Accords with Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in September, 2006.

• The promulgation of The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (Order of Justice) in accordance with the demands of the TTP’s Fazlullah and the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM: Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) in April, 2009.

Of all of these agreements, only the accords with Maulvi Nazir and Hafiq Gul Bahadur still stand, mostly because of the sake of mutual benefit – both Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur have agreed to restrain from attacking Pakistan as long as Pakistan does not interfere with their current campaigns in Afghanistan. Additionally, Islamabad has also agreed to turn a blind eye towards the presence of the Haqqani Network and the Hekmatyar Group in North Waziristan as long as they don’t side with the TTP and attack Pakistan. This agreement is mutually beneficial for both parties involved as the militants will find a safe haven that is only threatened by the occasional US Predator drone while the Pakistanis will, as they hope, find an ally in Kabul when NATO withdraws from Afghanistan after 2014 and the militants currently seeking sanctuary in Pakistan return to Afghanistan.


The Shakai and Sararogha agreements

The Shakai and Sararogha agreements only ended up hurting Pakistan in the end. The Shakai agreement, short-lived as it was, created a feeling amongst the militant population that Nek Mohammad had somehow defeated the Pakistani army . It also gave legitimacy to his rule . What all of that translated into was more recruitment and fund-raising for the militants. Similarly, the Sararogha agreement only helped elevate the status of Baitullah Mehsud to some sort of a local hero, who had defied both Washington and Islamabad and lived to tell about it. In both cases, the TTP proved that they would always break their agreements.

The Shakai peace agreement’s main clauses :

• The government shall evacuate the area immediately after the announcement of the agreement.
• The government shall pay compensation for deaths and properties of the tribes destroyed during operation.
• The government shall do its best to minimize its interference in tribal areas.

• The government shall release all the innocent people arrested during the operation.

• The government shall give one-month deadline to foreign elements to voluntarily hand over themselves to the government or announce to start a peaceful social life. The tribal society shall give the guarantee of their peaceful conduct.

• The Peshawar Corps Commander shall visit Wana along with FATA secretary and ISI director as a goodwill gesture to local tribes.

• The tribesmen shall never conduct any violent activity in Pakistan.

• The tribes shall never allow use of their land against any other country.

(Note: “tribes” can be read as “militant groups” and “government” can be interpreted as “army”).

Not only does this agreement appear to be a capitulation from the government side but the conditions that were imposed on the militants and tribes were never followed .

The Sararogha peace deal had much of the same clauses. The JUI-F’s chief himself helped broker this accord . The Sararogha came under much scrutiny from various quarters, mostly because no clause forbade the militants from handing over men wanted by the US, including the ex-Guantanamo Bay detainee, Abdullah Mehsud. Within the span of a year, the TTP broke the Sararogha agreement after the Red Mosque operation in July, 2007 and began carrying out attacks on the Pakistani security forces . The peace deal was used by Baitullah Mehsud to increase his strength by almost 20 times .

The TTP's Relations with other Militant Groups

The TTP leadership has time and again taken its oath of loyalty to Mullah Omar  and has declared him its supreme leader during its foundation. However, the TTP does not share Mullah Omar’s views on Pakistan and, against his orders, attacks both government and civilian targets in Pakistan. Mullah Omar tried to install a peace agreement between the TTP and the Pakistanis through the Shura Ittehadul Mujahideen agreement in January, 2009 but that deal did not materialize into what was desired. However, it is important to note that two foreign organizations – al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – are allies of the TTP.

The TTP’s relations with the other militant groups in FATA and Afghanistan are a mix of peaceful to being at war . For instance, although initially, the South Waziristan Abdullah Mehsud group of South Waziristan was a part of the TTP, Abdullah split from Baitullah with his 2,000 fighters on whether or not to engage the Pakistani army. However, the two groups never went to war. Another Mehsud group that the TTP were not at ease with was the Sheryar Mehsud group. Sheryar Mehsud claimed the leadership of the Mehsud tribe but only has 150 fighters. Although he, too, is anti-government, his differences with the TTP were never reconciled.

The TTP’s relations with the pro-Pakistan Maulvi Nazir group have also been tense. In April 2007, Maulvi Nazir, an Ahmedzai Wazir, drove more than 2,000 Uzbek fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan from North Waziristan. The fleeing fighters sought refuge with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan and became his allies. In September 2009, Maulvi Nazir’s men came under attack from some Uzbek fighters in Salay Rogha, South Waziristan. 11 of them died in that incident. Thus far, the TTP has refused to hand over the perpetrators to Maulvi Nazir, thereby straining relations between the Mehsuds and the Ahmadzai Wazirs . The Haji Sharif and Noor Islam groups, two anti-Nazir groups in North Waziristan, on the other hand, share good relations with the TTP.

Another major player in the Waziristan region is the Turkistan Bhittani group. The Bhittanis are the smallest of the three main tribes of Waziristan and are pro-government. In 2008, the TTP overran Jandola, killing 30 members of a Bhittani peace committee. Ever since then, the two groups have been in a state of cold war with one another.

The Punjabi Taliban, namely Harkat-ul- Jihad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jamiat-ul-Ansar, Jamiat-ul-Furqan, and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, are all on friendly terms with the TTP. Many members of these aforementioned groups have been given refuge in South Waziristan, albeit against the wishes of the local populace .

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Where do they get their money from? How are they funded?

Much has been talked about the sources of the TTP’s seemingly limitless supplies of weapons and cash. The Pakistani media has often speculated that the TTP receives its funding from India and the United States so that it can create instability in Pakistan and give the US an excuse to invade and de-nuke the Islamic Republic. Supporting evidence for these claims, unfortunately, has never been given and thus, these claims are no mere than mere rhetoric and conspiracy theories . Holes in this theory also appear as virtually every TTP leader has been attacked by US drone strikes. Moreover, the claim that Indian weapons have been ceased from the TTP can be discounted on two grounds: one, the Pakistani military has never officially complained about this and two, even if India were to fund and arm the TTP, it would never do use using its own weapons. Even the US armed the Afghan mujahideen with Soviet-made weapons captured by Israel from Egypt in1973 instead of handing over US-made arms to the fighters  (although US made Stinger missiles were transferred to them towards the end of the war).

On the other hand, it has become clear over the years that the TTP funds itself through kidnapping, extortion, smuggling and donations (both foreign and local) . According to Maulvi Omar, a spokesman of the TTP, “Though we condemn kidnapping for ransom, if it’s meant for the promotion of the Islamic cause, then it’s very much fair ”. The Pakistani police claim that the Pakistani Taliban claim ransoms of up to US$250,000 and as many as 70 victims were kidnapped in 2010 alone . Prominent members of Pakistani society, such as businessmen and television personalities are often targeted by the TTP’s criminal wings. The Pakistani television actor, Arshad Hussain had to pay US$11,500 for his release. Other targets for kidnapping include aid workers, journalists and tourists. The British-Pakistani journalist Asad Qureshi was held by the Taliban in Waziristan for 6 months before he was rescued .

Apart from kidnapping, the TTP make the best possible use of the black market. For example, according to the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy in Peshawar, during their two years in power in Swat, the TTP stripped the surrounding pine forests of an up to US$100 million in timber . Other valuables from the regions, gems and antiquities included, provide further revenue to the TTP. Peshawar’s bazars are lush with smuggled goods, where they are purchased and taken to Lahore and Karachi.

Extorting local businesses is another way of raising funds. FATA is known for its fine, light-colored marble, which is in high demand in Karachi and Lahore. Instead of taking over these mining operations, the Taliban have begun imposing “protection taxes” on every truckload of these stones, charging US$10 per truck with up to 50 trucks crossing their checkpoints daily .

A smaller and more benign method of raising funds is through donations. The United Nations estimates that up to 15% of the Taliban’s funding comes through donations. According to Dr. Said Alam Mehsud of FATA, the local sources for the Taliban include small boxes in shops where sympathizers drop spare change to help finance “the Islamic cause”, collections in mosques and religious seminaries, women donating their jewelry or wealthy businessmen donating as much as US$100,000 at times .

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Indigenous movement or foreign mercenaries/agents?

The narrative in most Pakistani circles in Lahore and Rawalpindi is that the Pakistani Taliban are nothing more than agents of the Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and the American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). It is believed that the aim of the TTP is to create instability inside Pakistan so that, one day, the state machinery becomes so weak that the US has to intervene militarily in order to 'remove' Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is asserted that the Taliban do not attack Muslims whereas the TTP has made it a point to attack Muslim Pakistanis. It is very conveniently forgotten that most of the victims of the 'Afghan' Taliban have been Muslims. Furthermore, no evidence to this day has been provided by anyone that suggests that the TTP are mercenaries hired by foreign agencies. In fact, evidence to the contrary is abundant, the most glaring being the TTP's Camp Chapman attack of December 2009, in which 9 CIA agents lost their lives.


So can the TTP be considered foreign proxies or do they believe in the righteousness of the cause that they are fighting for? The evidence suggests that although the TTP leadership is indigenous and indoctrinated at home, there are many fighters within their ranks, especially Arabs (of al-Qaeda)  and Uzbeks (of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), who are foreign to the region. There have even been Muslim nationals of Germany, France and the Netherlands, who have been killed or captured fighting alongside the TTP, but their numbers are limited . However, as a whole, the TTP is a homegrown movement with its leadership as well as fighting force consisting mostly of Ahmadzai Wazirs, the Mehsuds, and the Bhittanis tribes .

All the major TTP commanding figures - Nek Mohammad, Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud, Qari Hussain, Wali-ur-Rehman, Maulana Fazlullah and others are Pakistani nationals. Furthermore, they have all received education from religious seminaries in Pakistan. Their radicalization was also a part of the then join Pak-US venture to raise anti-Soviet militant-forces from FATA. In all the cases, the TTP commanders received practical training on the battlefield in Afghanistan with the blessing of the Pakistani security apparatus, which, itself, was involved in Afghanistan’s civil war (1992-2001) .

Around 85% of the TTP funding is also local , which comes by means of kidnapping, extortion, illegal checkpoints, the drug trade, seminaries and other means (details in the next blog). However, most of the military techniques and strategies employed by the TTP (especially the extensive use of IEDs) come from experienced al-Qaeda operatives who fought in Iraq .

Furthermore, the Arab and Uzbek fighters entered Waziristan at the behest of Nek Mohammad, who had led most of the fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban members to his native Waziristan after October, 2001. Initially, Pakistan turned a blind eye towards these militants, who were now pouring in my the thousands, and decided to take no action against them as long as they were “registered” by the local Pashtun Taliban commanders and they did not attack the Pakistani state (Shakai peace agreement) . However, these peace agreements began to unravel as US drones began bombarding Waziristan and Musharraf launched the Red Mosque operation in Islamabad. All of these fighters, foreigners amongst them turned against the Pakistanis. During the 2008 operation Rah-e-Nijat, the Pakistani army estimated that there were between 500 and 5,000 Uzbek militants in South Waziristan, along with 10,000 to 20,000 indigenous Taliban fighters . Given the low casualty-count of the operation, nevertheless, it is believed that the lower estimate was correct instead of the higher figure of 5,000 as the military declared victory in South Waziristan after having killed and captured only 600 militants .

Another aspect of the TTP, which points towards it being a predominantly local organization, is the inclusion of Punjabis in the terror group. Terrorist groups such as the Sipa-Sahaba Pakistan (the soldiers of the Companions), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (the army of Jhangvi), Lashkar-e-Taiba (the army of the righteous) and other groups, that have traditionally been based in Punjab, have become allied with the TTP . In fact, the 10th October 2009 attack on the Pakistani army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi was launched by the Punjabi Taliban in support of their cousins in Waziristan.

Therefore, it may be concluded that although a small percentage of the TTP’s fighting force consists of foreign fighters, they are not mercenaries (guns for hire). Those sections of foreign fighters within the TTP’s ranks are hardened fundamentalists who have left their native homelands in Central Asia, Punjab and the Middle-East with the belief that their cause is justified and worth dying for. The core and rank and file of the TTP is predominantly indigenous. Furthermore, the origins and direction of the TTP continue to remain homegrown.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Origins, Objectives and Key Commanders (Part three)


Hakimullah Mehsud

Although Baitullah’s death had a massive impact on the TTP’s practical capabilities, it did not change their objectives – the most dangerous of which is to challenge and fight the Pakistani government for as long as it supports Washington’s war in Afghanistan and until Shari'ah Law is established in Pakistan. 

In August, 2009, the shura (council) of the TTP met at a secret location to elect a new amir (leader). Allegedly, there was a gunfight during the meeting in which Hakimullah Mehsud was injured after the contender for the title of amir, Wali-ur-Rehman opened fire on him . Al-Qaeda and Mullah Omar intervened in the matter by instructing the TTP: “you must follow the path of a great leader… and save your bullets for your true enemies ”. Whatever occurred during that meeting remains a mystery; the only thing certain was that Hakimullah Mehsud was then elected as the new amir and Wali-ur-Rehman became the chief commander officer in South Waziristan. 

Hakimullah was born in 1980 in Kotkai village in South Waziristan. He is also known as Jamshed and Zulfikar Mehsud. Incidentally, he studied at the same madressah as Baitullah although the latter was senior to him and he also dropped out without completing his studies. From a very young age, Hakimullah was eccentric, adventurous, brave and indifferent to the plight of those around him. He is described by those who have met him as a man who would rather kill a man than talk to him . He was also, interestingly, a member of Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman’s JUI-F party.

Syed Shoaib Hasan of the BBC describes his meeting with Hakimullah Mehsud: “When we met on that autumn day in 2007, he took us for a drive.  To demonstrate his skill with the vehicle, he drove like a man possessed, maneuvering around razor sharp bends at impossible speeds.  He finished the demonstration by braking inches short of a several hundred foot drop.  While the rest of us sat in stunned silence, he just laughed chillingly and stuck the car in reverse to smoothly continue the journey”.

In accordance with his reckless and adventurous nature, he began his tenure or career as amir by launching a brazen attack on the Pakistani army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi. Only days before that, he had attacked the World Food Program offices in Islamabad and a crowded market in Peshawar. Two days after the attack on the GHQ, on October 12th, he attacked a market in Shangla in Swat, which had earlier been declared free of militants. More attacks followed on Pakistan’s police and intelligence agencies across Punjab. 

Hakimullah Mehsud proved that he was, in fact, far more adventurous than his media-shy and restrained predecessor. However, his blatant attacks only helped firm the resolve of the Pakistanis to get rid of him. Even his conservative sympathizers began to wonder whether or not Hakimullah was an Indian or American agent in disguise, although such claims lack the necessary evidence to be considered seriously.

By 19th June, 2009, Pakistan gathered 45,000 soldiers in Waziristan and launched operation Raj-e-Nijat (the path to salvation). After putting up pockets of resistance, Hakimullah’s men retreated into North Wazirstan and Orakzai, having suffered more than 600 casualties. The Pakistani army moved in and secured South Waziristan, despite the fact that various areas were booby-trapped with deadly IEDs. However, the operation failed to capture any of the key TTP commanders, who were now busy regrouping in the other agencies of FATA. Furthermore, the displacement of the TTP failed to curtail the organization’s ability to devastate Pakistani cities with their suicide-bombing campaign as Peshawar continued to be bomb every second day even during November, 2009 and the regional ISI office in Lahore was also attacked. In addition to that, TTP gunmen also attacked a packed mosque in Parade Lane in Islamabad, where mostly military personell and their families go to pray. Out of the 36 casualties, 17 were children and 2 were serving generals .

Hakimullah once again made headlines in December, 2009, when he appeared in the farewell video of Abu Mulal al-Balawi, who later went into Afghanistan and carried out a suicide attack in Khost, killing seven CIA operatives and a Jordanian agent with him . However, in a Predator Drone attack in January, 2010, on Shaktoi, South Waziristan, Hakimullah Mehsud was believed to have been killed. In another strange twist, in an audio message released on the 16th of January, Hakimullah confirmed that he was alive although doubts are cast over the date of its recording. To date, no one knows whether or not he is alive although intelligence sources indicate that he is alive, while he could very well be seriously injured.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Origins, Objectives and Key Commanders (Part two)



Baitullah Mehsud

From the 15th of December, 2007 until August 5, 2009, the key figure and guiding-head of the TTP was Baitullah Mehsud. He headed the organization during its most destructive and lethal phase.

Baitullah’s rise to power is nothing short of phenomenal. He became the first non-Malik in recent history to ascend to such a position of authority in the tribal structure of FATA . Educated only till the age of twelve in a religious seminary, his youth was spent fighting alongside Mullah Omar’s Taliban in Afghanistan. Highly conservative, Baitullah even refused to be photographed and held Mullah Omar in high esteem, referring to him as the amir-ul-momineen or the prince of the faithful. After having retreated to Pakistan after 2001, Baitullah began to rise as a prominent figure in his native Waziristan by using his illegal FM radio channel to enforce Shari’ah with a view to prevent vice and promote virtue. He was also responsible for bringing in thousands of Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Uzbek fighters into Waziristan after their retreat from Tora Bora .

As his influence grew in the region, he began implementing Mullah Omar’s version of Shari’ah in Waziristan. Beards became mandatory for men and the all-encompassing burkha (veil) became obligatory for women. Even the famous Wazirstani folk singer, Kamal Mehsud, was forced to settle into Islamabad during this time-period.

There are two events in Baitullah’s life that solidified his position as Waziristan’s de facto Amir and helped him gain more recruits to his cause. The first is the Sararogha peace accord of February 2005, during which Lt. Gen Sadfar Hussain, the then Peshawar Corps Commander, stood next to Baitullah Mehsud and in front of an audience of about a thousand people, declared him a “soldier of peace”, to which the crowd changed, “Allah-o-Akbar” and “Death to America” . He was also offered US$20 million by the Pakistani government to repay his debts to Al-Qaeda . Needless to say, the numbers of his followers swelled because of this treaty.

The second incident that further popularized Baitullah was the rather curious capture of up to 300 Pakistani soldiers by the TTP’s men in Ladha, in August, 2007, officers up to the rank of major among them . Hakimullah Mehsud, one of Baitullah’s top lieutenants, was in charge of the unit that conducted this capture. The soldiers were later exchanged for the release of convicted Taliban detainees in Pakistani prisons. The incident was a huge blow to Musharraf’s as well as the Pakistani army’s prestige and showed how demotivated the common soldiery was in what it thought was an American war on terror.

Baitullah Mehsud was also responsible for various other attacks in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar from 2008 onwards, which will be discussed in detail in the next few blog entries. Astoundingly though, he also declared in December 2008 that he would send his fighters against India if it retaliated against Pakistan for the Mumbai attacks .

By February, 2009, however, there was another peace deal between Baitullah Mehsud and the Pakistani government; though this time the Pakistanis denied it in public. This was the time period when Mullah Omar himself called on Baitullah to stop his attacks on Pakistan and focus instead on Afghanistan. Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gulbahadur had already parted ways with the TTP as early as 2007 because of the latter’s attacks on Pakistan but the three came together in 2009 as the Shura Ittehadul Mujahideen (the Council of Unity of Holy Warriors). He spent such peace deals directing his forces to plant IEDs on military routes .

Baitullah thus met his end when his power was at its peak. He had routed all opposition from Waziristan, especially the pro-ANP and pro-PPP camps, and had become untouchable – or so he thought. George Bush’s White House had always designated Baitullah Mehsud as a militant and not an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist. Therefore, the Bush administration showed little interest in killing or capturing him. However, with Obama in the White House, that changed. On March 26, 2009, the US State Department announced a prize of US$5 million for Baitullah Mehsud’s capture or death. To understand how serious Obama was about this, Mullah Omar’s bounty was US$10 million, not that far off from Baitullah Mehsud’s . Obama wanted to send a message to the Pakistanis that the US would not accept peace with the Taliban at any cost. The Obama administration was especially afraid of letting this war slip out of its fingers. Mark Hosenball observed that “officials in both Washington and Islamabad suspect that Mehsud has contacts inside the ISI… (who are) tipping him off before the Pakistani security forces can pounce ”.

The US’s new envoy to the region, Richard Halbrooke upped the ante by referring to Baitullah Mehsud as a “terrible man” who is “as bad as any actor can be ”. Fearing he is being encircled, Baitullah unleashed his terror on Pakistani cities, carrying out suicide-attacks on police, military and even civilian targets.

Pakistan’s public enemy number one met his end in peculiar circumstances. Having had only daughters with his first wife, he had only recently gotten married to a local cleric’s daughter in Zangarha village in South Waziristan because he desired a son . As a diabetic, he would usually lose some sensation in his limbs and was, on that night of 5th August, 2009, getting his leg massaged on his father-in-law’s roof. An unmanned US Predator drone fired a single Hellfire Missile that instantly killed Baitullah Mehsud and his wife. After a few days of silence and contradictory statements, the TTP finally accepted his death . Whether it was Baitullah’s growing ties to Mullah Omar that forced the US to accept him as a high-level target or Pakistan’s fear that Talibanization within its borders was getting out of control, the fact is that the man had reneged on several promises and had made it clear that he preferred chaos and anarchy over peace.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Origins, Objectives and Key Commanders (Part one)



Nek Mohammad

The origin of the TTP in Pakistan begins with one man - Nek Mohammad . Nek was an active member of the Taliban in Afghanistan. He joined the movement in 1993 at the age of 18 and during the Taliban regime, had fought alongside the Pakistani FC (Frontier Constabulary militia) in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance . However, after the fall of the Taliban regime in Kabul and Kandahar by the 7th of December 2001, he retreated to Wana and even helped facilitate Taliban and Al-Qaeda to settle in Waziristan.

By 2003, Nek Mohammad began gathering local tribesmen to attack NATO forces in Afghanistan with the help of Afghan war veterans Haji Omar, Omar Sharif and Maulvi Abbas. Additionally, he began giving refuge to the family members of the Afghan Taliban, the Arab fighters of Al-Qaeda and the Uzbek militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan of Tahir Yuldashey .

During this time, Pakistan’s policy was that of turning a blind eye to not only these militant activities but also to the continuing build-up of foreign militants, wanted men amongst them, in the tribal areas, particularly Waziristan .  However, under constant pressure from the United States to act against the buildup of militants in its own territory, Pakistan was compelled into launching its largest military operation yet against Nek Mohammad. Assisted by Baitullah Mehsud, Abdullah Mehsud and others, Nek Mohammad fought the Pakistani army for several weeks. The intense fighting was only concluded with the Shakai agreement between the Pakistani army and the now emerging Pakistani Taliban.

The Shakai agreement was troublesome and inconclusive at best. Not only was there no written agreement but no foreign militants surrendered. Even Nek Mohammad did not surrender . The only effect of this agreement was that Nek Mohammad was transformed overnight into a hero who had “defeated” the Pakistani army . However, within two weeks of the agreement, Nek Mohammad was targeted and killed in a US drone attack .

The death of Nek Mohammad, instead of being a serious blow to militant activities in FATA, ended up having the opposite effect. Not only was Nek’s status further elevated as a martyr but his followers began seeing the need for unifying the scattered groups of fighters under an umbrella organization. In December, 2003, commanders from South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur and Darra Adamkhel tribal regions and the districts of Swat, Buner, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan and Kohat met secretly and chalked out the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.



The Alliance

The secret meeting of the various Taliban commanders in December, 2007 led to the formation of a Taliban shura or council of forty Taliban groups. They became popularly known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud was elected as the group’s amir or leader. Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a North Waziristan commander, was elected as the deputy chief while the honorary position of general secretary went to the “FM Mullah”, Fazlullah of Swat. However, Hafiz Gul Bahadur soon fell out with the TTP and parted ways in order to join in with Mullah Nazir of North Waziristan, who had signed peace agreements with Pakistan . The TTP, however, considered Pakistan a murtid (or apostate) state, especially after the ill-advised Red Mosque operations of the Musharraf regime that left dozens of seminary students dead and caused widespread outrage amongst Pakistani society. The Red Mosque operation was also the impetus behind some of the most deadly suicide attacks on Pakistan’s armed forces .

The objectives of the TTP were simple. Jihad or holy war was now to be conducted with coordinated efforts, the aim being maximum pressure on NATO and its Pakistani allies. At the same time, they would also combine their resources and manpower to become an effective fighting force. The main objective of the organization was to defeat the ISAF forces in Afghanistan, established their brand of Shari’ah Law in FATA and Afghanistan or restore the Caliphate, as they prefer to call it .

Speaking to Al-Jazeera journalist Ahmed Zaidan in January, 2008, Baitullah Mehsud said, “The main objective of the coalition of militants is waging a defensive jehad. The Pakistan army is deploying its soldiers under order from George Bush. The army is bombarding our houses and fighting with us. Therefore, we have formed this coalition to guarantee the safety of civilians and this war which the army launched in the tribal areas is an American war. We no more feel sad about the Pakistani soldiers’ deaths. They are actually implementing the orders of the West and the US and they are destroying our houses. And I do pray that Allah will guide them back to the right path because they are Muslims and this is an Islamic country. But when the army soldiers tome to this areas to kill us, we will definitely be killing them”.

Curiously enough, the council has also adopted article 5 of NATO, citing that an attack on any one of the members of the TTP would be considered an attack on the entire organization . The TTP, thus, spread its network in all seven agencies of the FATA and in the settled districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Bannu, Karak, Hangu, Kulachi, Dera Ismail Khan (D.I. Khan), Lakki Marwat, Doaba, Kohat, Dir, Buner, and to some extent Mardan, the Swat Valley, and Shangla district .

South Waziristan, particularly Miram Shah, became the headquarters and the base of operations for the TTP. Concurrently, South Waziristan’s federally appointed political agent became a mere spectator as the TTP virtually took over all of South Waziristan’s affairs, becoming the judge, jury, executioner as well as the police, the taxation authority, the religious authority and the executive of the agency. The state-writ of Pakistan was systematically and swiftly dismantled. Following the traditional Taliban extreme interpretation of Deobandi Sunni Islam with a heavy dose of Salafi or Wahabi influences, the TTP began growing into prominence by attacking the Shi’ite minority in neighboring D.I. Khan . The TTP also began carrying out deadly attacks against the poorly armed soldiers of the FC, a trend that continues to this day .

However, the TTP’s activities did not stop there. As allies of Al-Qaeda , the TTP not only facilitated Al-Qaeda’s global jihad ideals but also helped train and equip various groups and individuals that were meant to carry out attacks in mainland Europe, the United Kingdom and North America .